"It is such a coincidence that we exist. It is such a coincidence... Accident... Chance... Random"
But the two most important things are that every second of every minute of the universe's existence these "coincidences" keep being created, and, if that "coincidence" can't be reproduced over and over, over the course of massive amounts of time, then it wouldn't exist now (as so many things don't). So we can call us being here "coincidental" or our universe being hospitable to life a "coincidence", but in reality, we are no more an anomaly than anything else. Additionally, very importantly, if we didn't reproduce the stable patterns of a body or even further back in time, cell division, then we wouldn't be here either. But. The vital aspects of environment-organism has been kept stable, in a way that has allowed reproduction of biochemical matter, for us to eventually have been evolved into.
So if you ask me. Yes, of course it is a coincidence that we exist and it depended on the stability of our environment. But we are as improbable as anything else that currently exist in our universe, and, considering the number of "coincidences" created (and the vast majority deconstructed) all the time, it is infinitely probable that 'that which can be reproduced' will continue to exist. So we are not a coincidence. (I don't subscribe to determinism or anthrocentrism, so, no, the universe didn't evolve to provide space for us. The universe has no intention, it just is. But that is the topic of another post. Or book.)
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